This action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 is currently before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion to file their second amended complaint [Doc. No. 33-1], and the defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 18-1], amended motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 27-1], motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 36-1] and request to file original discovery [Doc. No. 41-1].

The plaintiffs...are all employees of the Atlanta-Fulton Public Library System ("AFCLS"). All the plaintiffs are white females except [Monica] Foderingham-Brown, who is an African-American female. Prior to May 25, 2000, all the plaintiffs worked at the Central Branch of the Library System ("Central Library") in downtown Atlanta.

[All but one of the] defendants......are...members of the AFCLS Board of Trustees ("Board"). McClure is the Chairman of the AFCLS Board. Defendant Mary Kaye Hooker ("Hooker") is the Director of the AFCLS. All the individual defendants have been sued in their individual and official capacities except defendants [and Board members] Banks, Fern, Clement, Gibson, Johnson, Maddux, and Woolford, who have been sued only in their official capacities. Thus, only McClure, [Emma] Darnell, [Dorothy] Blake, [Mary] Ward, [Benjamin] Jenkins, and Hooker have been sued in both their individual and official capacities.

The plaintiffs allege that they were transferred out of the Central Library to other branches on the basis of their race, or in the case of Foderingham-Brown, for speaking out against the Board of Trustees. The plaintiffs contend that the Board and Hooker designed and implemented a reassignment plan to achieve racial "equity" by reducing the number of white managers and maximizing the number of African-American managers at the Central Library. The defendants respond that the reassignment plan was not based on race, but on other non-discriminatory factors such as for personnel efficiency. As evidence of the discriminatory nature of the reassignment plan, the plaintiffs have produced several recorded statements and activities of Board members that indicate a discriminatory intent. These statements and activities included:

1. Blake’s admission during the April 11, 2000 Board meeting that the Board had a philosophy of achieving racial equity in the management at the Central Library and that Hooker carried out this philosophy;
2. An inquiry made by McClure in March 1999 regarding [his concern] that there was only one African-American manager at the Central Library;
3. McClure’s order in July of 1999 to prepare a study showing "the racial and ethnic makeup of the managers and assistant managers of the Central Library";
4. Ward’s claim that "there are too many white faces at the Central Library";
5. The minutes of the January 6, 2000 [Board committee] hearing where Ward raised a concern that "the Central Library...has in it a white-dominated administration" and McClure’s agreement that this was "an issue" that the Board must address;
6. Hooker’s January 7, 2000 letter admitting that the Board was examining racial managerial staffing patterns at the Central Library;
7. Darnell’s alleged intent on eliminating the "plantation mentality" from the library system;
8. Jenkins, as Chairman of the [Board’s] Personnel Committee, presented the reassignment plan [to the Board] as being solely [a matter of approving] "new hires"and not [an unprecedented number of Central Library] reassignments.

Along with the proffered direct evidence, the plaintiffs emphasize that the effect of the reorganization plan may also serve as circumstantial evidence because it transferred a substantial number of white librarians and managers out of the Central Library and replaced them with African-American managers.

In a separate claim, plaintiff Foderingham-Brown asserts that she was transferred out of the Central Library in retaliation for being an outspoken critic of the Board and for organizing a petition to remove members of the Board. In 1998, Foderingham-Brown, as President of the Library Staff Association, organized a petition to remove members of the Board to protest the Board’s actions which forced then-Library Director Julie Hunter to resign. Foderingham-Brown also believed that the Board was "micro-managing" AFCLS and that this practice would prevent quality candidates for the Library Director position from applying. Foderingham-Brown’s role in organizing the petition was widely publicized and heard on at least one radio station. At the time of the petition, McClure, Ward, and Darnell were all members of the Board. Two years later, in May of 2000, Foderingham-Brown was transferred out of the Central Library to the Hapeville Branch, where she was supposed to assist in outreach programs for Vietnamese- and Spanish-speaking patrons, even though she speaks neither language. Foderingham-Brown alleges that she was transferred because of her prior criticism of the Board, [criticism] which constituted protected speech under the First Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution].

For all of the transfers, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs were in no way demoted or received substantial job reclassifications. Moreover, the defendants emphasize that the plaintiffs received the same amount of pay and benefits after the transfer as they did before the transfer. Thus, the defendants argue that even if the transfers were based in part on race or [protected] speech, the plaintiffs cannot claim any damages or harm from the transfers.

This court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on September 1, 2000 [Doc. No. 21-1]. The defendants have moved to dismiss and moved for summary judgment. The court will first consider the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

[...]

I. Section 1983 Claims [...]

A. Equal Protection Claim [...]

1. Evidence of Discriminatory Intent [...]

...Plaintiffs have presented several instances of direct evidence of intentional discrimination. The minutes of the Board of Trustees’ own meetings reveal that the Board had the intention of shifting personnel on the basis of race. Board members also made several statements which indicate discriminatory motives. There are many other instances of direct evidence of discriminatory intent enumerated by the plaintiffs. In short, the plaintiffs have clearly met their burden [of proof] by establishing a genuine issue of material fact from direct evidence alone.

In addition to showing discriminatory intent, the plaintiffs must also show a pattern or practice of discrimination for the purposes of establishing liability under Section 1983 against the members of the Board of Trustees in their official capacities....

The plaintiffs contend that because the Board of Trustees and Hooker are the decisionmakers who possess final authority to transfer library employees, even one instance of a racially motivated transfer would establish municipal liability. The defendants respond that the Board members were not the final authority because the transfers were subject to a grievance review hearing. However, the grievance hearing committee members refused to address the alleged racial discrimination claims and specifically left those issues to this court. Thus, it appears from the facts presented in this case that the Board of Trustees of AFCLS had the final authority to transfers the plaintiffs. Because the plaintiffs have presented direct evidence of discriminatory intent and action by the Board, AFCLS may be held liable.... Accordingly, summary judgment on the plaintiffs’...equal protection claims against the Board members and Hooker in their official capacities is hereby DENIED.

In the present case, the court finds that Foderingham-Brown did not meet [the] burden [of proof required by the relevant statutes and case law]. Moreover, ...Foderingham-Brown has not presented any evidence besides her own conclusory assertions in her answers to interrogatories that she was transferred because of her [protected] speech. Foderingham-Brown has not presented evidence that she was confronted by Board members or even spoke directly to Board members concerning the petition or critical speech. Although the court is highly skeptical of the Board members’ statements that they did not know who Foderingham-Brown was when they reassigned her [Foderingham-Brown was President of the Library Staff Association and her critical comments regarding the Board were publicized both on the radio and in the newspaper], the court may not allow a jury question on this issue when there is remote temporal causation and no other corroborating evidence that Foderingham-Brown was transferred because of her speech. Allowing the present claim to go forward would turn almost every adverse action against a public employee who made previous protected speech into a jury question and effectively abrogate the "substantial motivating factor" [legal] test. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Foderingham-Brown’s...claim is hereby GRANTED.

The court now turns to the equal protection claims against the defendants in their individual capacities.... In analyzing a defense of qualified immunity [in this case], the court must first consider whether the Board members were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful acts occurred....The plaintiffs must then demonstrate that the Board members violated clearly established law based upon objective standards....

Based on the evidence presented by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have shown that the Board members were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when they made the various employment decisions at issue. Moreover, there can be no doubt that in May of 2000, when the Board decided to transfer the plaintiffs out of the Central Library allegedly because of their race, "it was clearly established that intentional discrimination in the workplace on account of race violated federal law." Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1302, 1321 (11^th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F3d 402, 407 (11^th Cir. 1995). The plaintiffs have also presented substantial evidence indicating the defendants’ discriminatory intent. Therefore, the court declines to grant defendants McClure, Darnell, Blake, Ward, Jenkins, and Hooker qualified immunity on the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.

The plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint [Doc. No. 33-1] is hereby GRANTED. The defendants’ amended motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED. The defendants’ amended motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 27-1] is DENIED. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 36-1] is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The defendants’ request to file original discovery [Doc. No. 41-1] is hereby GRANTED.

So ORDERED, this 1^st day of December, 2000

[Signed] Beverly B. Martin

United States District Judge

Other Documents Available at this Site